Working Paper 5

American Households in Demographic Perspectives

By Christine Winquist Nord and Nicholas Zill

1991, Institute for American Values

Introduction

Once the word household was nearly synonymous with family. In fact, a dictionary published in 1939 defined a household as "those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family; a domestic establishment."[1] The two terms, however, are no longer interchangeable. American households have undergone unprecedented changes during this century, changes which have become more marked in the last thirty years. Compared to earlier in this century, households nowadays are smaller, more people live alone, and the proportion of households maintained by families has decreased.

Households maintained by families have also changed. They are less likely to be maintained by married couples and more likely to be headed by an unmarried male or female. These changes reflect more deep-seated changes in our society -- changes in our values, our attitudes, and our behavior. The combination of changing household arrangements and the shifts in values, attitudes, and behavior have important ramifications not only for individual men, women, and children, but also for family life and for the larger American society. In this essay, we look at what has happened to American households, why it has happened, and what it may mean for our future.

In documenting the changes that have occurred to American households in recent decades, we use the definitions of household and family currently employed by the Census Bureau. They distinguish households from group quarters and family households from non-family households. According to the Census Bureau, a **household** consists of all the persons who occupy a house, an apartment, a set of rooms, or even a single room which serves as separate living quarters and which has direct access to the outside or access to the outside through a common hall. To qualify as a household the occupants must not live or eat with other persons residing in the structure. **Family households** are those which are owned, rented, or otherwise maintained by an individual who is living with at least one other person who is related to him or her by birth, marriage, or adoption. **Non-family households** are those that are maintained by someone living alone or with non-relatives only. If ten or more unrelated individuals live together, the place is no longer considered a household, but is instead considered to be **group quarters**.[2] These rather dry definitions emphasize the place where individuals live and who is responsible for maintaining the residence. Very little emphasis is placed on the actual relationships of the persons residing together. Because the Census Bureau collects its information based on place of residence and not on family relationships, our overview of changes in the household and family in the last several decades provides no information about how people's links to those not living in their households have changed during the same period.

The American Household Since 1940

Of the approximately 249 million individuals living in the United States in 1990, nearly 99% or about 246 million, lived in households.[3] Those who did not lived in some type of group quarters, including barracks, dormitories, rooming houses, correctional facilities, long-term care hospitals, and mental institutions. In the past, the economic efficiencies obtained through the sharing of living quarters provided powerful incentives to maintain larger households. These

households often included individuals who were not related to the family, such as boarders, lodgers, and servants.[4] With the steady growth in wealth that the U.S. has experienced during this century, more people have been able to afford to establish households of their own. Throughout this century, the rate of growth of households has outstripped the rate of growth of the population[5] and, as a consequence, the average size of households has shrunk from 5.8 people per household in 1900[6] to 3.67 persons per household in 1940 to 2.63 in 1990 (see Tier 3 of Table 1). In recent years, a large part of the decrease in household size has been due to a substantial increase in individuals living alone, a trend often referred to as the rise of the primary individual.[7] Individuals living alone made up only 5% of all households in 1900.[8] The proportion living alone had not quite doubled by 1950 to 9%, but by 1990 one quarter of all households consisted of an individual living alone (see Table 1).

Family Households

When the word household was nearly interchangeable with family, most households included married couples.[9] The proportion of households that are maintained by families and the proportion that are maintained by married-couples have both decreased over time (see Table 1). In 1960, family households composed approximately 85% of all households, down from about 90% in 1940. As of 1990, family households represented 71% of all households. The proportion of married couple households remained fairly stable, at around 75%, between 1940 and 1960, but since 1960 has shrunk to represent 56% of all households. Moreover, the proportion of households consisting of families with children of their own under 18 decreased from not quite half of all households in 1960 to just over one-third of all households in 1990. The 1960 figure was somewhat higher than it had been in the previous two decades because of the baby boom.

It is important to remember, however, that although family households, in general, and married couple households, in particular, represent a smaller proportion of all households than they formerly did, families are, for most people, still a central part of life. Although family households accounted for just 71% of all households in 1990, 85% of the population lived in a household maintained by a family (see Tier 3 of Table 1). In the same vein, even though married couple households accounted for only 56% of all households in 1990, 68% of the U.S. population lived in a household maintained by a married couple (Tier 3 of Table 1). Survey data also emphasize the importance of family ties to Americans.[10] Such data are striking not only in the level of importance Americans place on family ties, but also in the very positive light in which people describe their own family lives.[11] Such rosy claims may be overstated, but they do indicate that some critics may be too pessimistic and cynical about the future of the family in America.

The relative distribution of household types is affected by changes in the number of both family households and non-family households. Accordingly, when trying to understand changes in the family, it is appropriate to restrict attention to family households (Tier 2 of Table 1). Since 1970, substantially more than half of the growth in family households has been due to families without own children under 18 (Tier 2 of Table 2). Some of these families are older couples whose children are already grown, while others are young families who have yet to have

children. Family households with dependent children, after increasing during the 1960s and 1970s because of the baby boom, returned in 1980 to the same proportion that they had been in 1940 and 1950: 52% of all family households. As of 1990, they had dropped to represent only 49% of all family households. However, even though their relative proportion is close to what it had been at mid-century, the composition of family households with dependent children has changed dramatically.

The growth in families with own children under 18 since 1970 has been entirely due to the growth in single-parent families. In fact, without the growth in single-parent families, there would have actually been a decline since 1970 in families with own children under 18 (Tier 2 of Table 2). In 1970, married couples with their own children accounted for about half of all family households; as of 1990, less than two out of every five families consisted of a married couple with their dependent children. Rising levels of divorce and separation in conjunction with a steadily increasing number of births to unmarried women account for the growth in single-parent families.[12] On the other side, delays in marriage and childbearing as well as aging of existing married couple families with children helped to further reduce the proportion of married couples with children under 18. The combination of all these changes concern many analysts for several reasons. Some fear that these trends portend the decline of the family. Many worry that the changing shape of the family is intimately linked to juvenile delinquency, drug use, and teen childbearing. Thus they worry about the productivity of the next generation of workers and the future of society as we know it. Regardless of whether these fears are warranted or not, it is true that childhood poverty is becoming increasingly concentrated among female-headed families. Research has shown that poor children are more likely to exhibit adverse behavioral and developmental outcomes.[13]

Non-family Households

While most types of family households, with the exception of those headed by women, have decreased as a fraction of all households since 1960, non-family households have grown substantially during the same period (Tier 1 of Table 1). In 1960, non-family households accounted for approximately one out of every six households. By 1990, they accounted for more than one-quarter of all households. Most of this growth occurred between 1970 and 1980 and was due to an increase in individuals living alone. Between 1970 and 1980, non-family households accounted for more than half of the growth in all households, and they accounted for nearly half the growth between 1980 and 1990 (Tier 1 of Table 2). This same decade saw the greatest increase in the sheer number of households. More than 17 million households were formed between 1970 and 1980, compared with just under 11 million between 1960 and 1970 and just under 13 million between 1980 and 1990 (Tier 1 of Table 2).

As the proportion of non-family households increases, the proportion of family households must decrease. If non-family households consist primarily of young adults, many of them will eventually form family households. As the share of non-family households increases, however, so does their influence on the political system, the economy, and society in general.

Their interests and needs may differ and even compete with those of family households. Thus the experience of family households in the United States depends to some extent on the size and composition of non-family households.

The characteristics of people who maintain non-family households has also changed in the last several decades. In 1960 approximately three out of five persons who were the heads of non-family households were 55 or older (see Table 3). Less than half of the heads of non-family households were 55 or older in 1990. Not quite 20% of persons maintaining non-family households were under age 45 in 1960; by 1990 the proportion had more than doubled to 43.1%.

In 1960 twice as many women as men were the head of a non-family household, and most of those women were widows. In 1990, females were still more likely than males to be the head of non-family households, but the gap had closed considerably. In addition, women who did head their own non-family households in 1990 were much less likely than their counterparts in 1960 to be widowed and more likely to be divorced or never married. Although the proportion of women 65 and older maintaining non-family households increased slightly from 45% in 1960 to 47% in 1990, there was a sharp reduction in the proportion of women 45 to 64 heading non-family households and an increase in the proportion of women under age 45 doing so.

The tale is somewhat different for men heading their own non-family households. In 1990, three out of four men heading non-family households were either divorced or never married, compared to about one out of two in 1960. However, approximately half of the men heading non-family households in 1990 were between the ages of 25 and 44, compared to about one-quarter in 1960. Fewer than one out of five men maintaining a non-family household in 1990 were age 65 or older.

Thus, among both men and women, but particularly among men, there has been a sharp increase in young adults -- those under age 45 -- living without family members. As with the changes in households, the largest shifts in the characataeristics of individuals heading non-family households occurred between 1970 and 1980.

The Demographic Explanations for Changing Household Structure

The number of households at any given time and the proportion of those that are family households depend on the size of the population, its age structure, the ability of individuals to set up their own households, and decisions made by individuals about marriage, divorce, and childbearing. The size of the population and its age structure are, in turn, primarily due to the fertility behavior of earlier cohorts and the mortality conditions to which individuals have been exposed.[14] We must look to these factors to find the demographic explanations for changing household structure.

The Size and Age Structure of the U.S. Population

Because of the baby boom[15] that occurred after World War II, the U.S. has a large bubble in its age structure that has been likened to a pig moving through a python. This bubble has had a large influence on U.S. society at each age it has passed through and will continue to do so.[16] Decisions about household and family formation made by this generation, therefore, have had a disproportionate influence on household and family patterns observed between 1970 and the present. It is no coincidence that the decade that saw the largest increase in the number of households and in the proportion of non-family households is the same decade that the vanguard of the baby boom reached adulthood.[17] Their entry into adulthood explains a large part of the increase in the number of households, particularly non-family households, during the 1970s.[18] However, some of the increase in households was also due to persons aged 65 and older.[19]

James Sweet, a demographer at the University of Wisconsin, analyzed the components of growth in the number of households during the decade 1970 to 1980.[20] He calculates that half of the increase in the number of households was due to households formed by people under age 35 and that most of that increase (64%) was due to the fact that there were more people under the age of 35. He attributes the remaining increase in households for this age group (36%) to an increased propensity among those under 35 to establish households of their own. Between 1980 and 1985, however, there appears to have been a slowing or even a reversal in the propensity for young, unmarried adults to establish their own households.[21]

Another quarter of the increase in households from 1970 to 1980 occurred because of people aged 65 and older.[22] Again, most of that increase (72%) occurred because there were more people in those ages, in part because of a relatively large cohort that entered those ages during that decade and in part because of large declines in mortality at older ages.[23] Yet as with young people, there was also an increased propensity among the elderly, particularly elderly widows, to establish their own households.[24]

Although the size of the population and a shifting age structure largely explain the jump in the number of households between 1970 and 1980, and undoubtedly continued to exert an influence through 1990 in the growth of the number of households, these factors do not explain why the relative proportion of household and family types changed the way that they did between 1970 and 1990. Nor do they explain why the young and the elderly were more likely to establish independent households during the decade 1970-1980.

The improved health and financial circumstances of the elderly are probably the main factors explaining their greater likelihood of living independently. In 1970, nearly one-quarter of all persons 65 and older were living in poverty. By 1987, the proportion had been halved to less than one out of eight living in poverty.[25] Similarly, there was a dramatic reduction in mortality among the elderly after 1970, mostly because of reductions in deaths due to chronic diseases.[26] The elderly aren't simply living longer, however. They are also in better health. Very few of the elderly who are not in institutions are limited in their ability to take care of themselves,[27] and thus most are capable of living independently if they so desire. The greater

longevity of men's lives as well as women's has meant that more marriages among the elderly are still intact rather than disrupted through the death of one of the partners. Thus the elderly are contributing to the increase in family households without children as well as to non-family households.

The explanations for the increased likelihood of young people to establish their own households during the 1970-1980 decade and then the apparent abatement or reversal in that trend since 1980 are not as obvious. Part of the explanation probably lies in changing economic and social circumstances. As the baby boom generation began entering adulthood in the late 1960s, the economic situation looked promising. Housing prices and rents were low. The "generation gap" between adults and youth was much discussed. Moreover, more youth than ever were attending college and thus leaving home for reasons other than marriage. The combination of these factors probably encouraged many young people to set up their own households and they continued to do so for a while despite changing economic circumstances.

The 1970s began with a recession followed by a brief recovery.[28] Almost immediately, however, there was a rapid inflation of food prices, followed by the oil shortages of 1973-1974, which tripled oil prices. The combination of these economic shocks caused median family income to fall between 1973 and 1975.[29] Housing prices began to rise precipitously, making the purchase of a house more difficult for a single individual to afford by the end of the decade.[30] Rents also climbed during this period. The 1980s also began with a severe recession. Again median family incomes fell through the early 1980s.[31] The high cost of housing coupled with the recession may help to account for the abatement in the tendency for young adults to live alone or with non-relatives since 1980.[32]

Other factors contributing to the rise in non-family households and to the likelihood of living alone include changing patterns of marriage and divorce. Previously married individuals have always tended to live on their own rather than return to their families of origin. When divorce rates began to rise at the same time that an unusually large cohort was passing through young adulthood, there were simply more formerly married people than ever before. It has not been typical, however, for young never-married people to set up their own households. As marriages began to be deferred and as more education was required to acquire good jobs, the interval between high school graduation and marriage lengthened. Regardless of marital status, it has always been the case that the likelihood of moving out on one's own increases as age increases.

James Sweet, in looking at the increases in the number of households between 1970 and 1980, examined the changes by the marital status of the household head. He calculates that the never-married population and the divorced or separated population accounted for nearly two-thirds of the increase in households during the 1970-80 decade. Nearly a third of the increase in households was due to the never-married population, with most of that third (61%) due to an increased propensity among the never-married to live alone and the remainder (39%) due to an increase in the number of individuals who were never married. Just over a third of the increase in households was due to individuals who had separated or divorced, with most of that increase (86%) due to an increase in the number of divorced persons rather than to an increased tendency

among the divorced and separated to establish their own households.[33]

Marriage Patterns

Marriage is an outward sign that two people are making a commitment to one another and that they intend to spend their lives together. Not only have a smaller proportion of adults been making that commitment, but the ones who do have been doing so at older ages, on average, than did their parents. That men and women have been delaying marriage is clearly evident from the trend in the median age at first marriage (see Table 4).[34] The median age at first marriage for both men and women, after steadily declining from 1890 until 1956, has been steadily increasing since 1956. As of 1990 the median age at first marriage for women was 23.9 years, higher than it has ever been in our recorded history. The median age at first marriage for men in 1990 was 26.1 years, also a record high, but identical to what it was in 1890. Although the median age at first marriage for men in 1990 is the same as what it had been at the turn of the century, the circumstances for the two periods are quite different.

The proportions of those who have never married by selected ages gives a different perspective on marriage in the United States. This measure also shows that marriage is being increasingly deferred or even forgone among recent cohorts (see Table 5). In 1990, 16.4% of women aged 30-34 and 27% of men that age had never married. These proportions are dramatically higher than those recorded in 1970, when 6.2% of women and 9.4% of men aged 30-34 had never married.

Formerly, marriage signaled the onset of sexual activity and the beginning of childbearing. In recent years, the initiation of sexual activity has been occurring at younger ages[35] and has become increasingly disassociated from marriage.[36] As marriage has become increasingly deferred and sexual activity outside of marriage has lost most of its stigma, cohabitation among unmarried couples has increased rapidly. According to Census Bureau estimates, there were 523,000 unmarried couple households in 1970. By 1990 the number had grown to 2.9 million.[37]

In general, cohabiting couples tend to be never married, young, childless couples. In 1990, nearly three out of five of the partners in cohabiting couples had never been married; approximately two out of five were divorced or separated from their spouses; and about three percent were widowed. Eighty-two percent of the partners were under age 45 with the modal ages being 25 to 34 years old. About 19 percent of the partners were under age 25.[38] In seven out of ten cases, there were no children under age 15 present.[39] The elderly are highly unlikely to cohabit.[40]

Currently cohabiting couples, although their numbers have increased sharply, represent only a small proportion of all households -- 3.1% in 1990, up from less than 1% in 1960 (see Table 6). The ratio of cohabiting couple households to married couple households is also relatively small -- there were approximately 5.5 cohabiting couples for every 100 married

couples in the United States in 1988, up from 1.1 in 1960.

The number and proportion of couples that are currently cohabiting, however, is a poor indicator of the number of couples that have ever cohabited. Bumpass and Sweet, using data from the National Survey of Families and Households, estimate that nearly half of all persons in their early 30s in 1987 have ever cohabited and that half of the recently married have ever cohabited.[41] Thus, although many men and women are clearly delaying marriage, they are not forgoing forms of intimacy that are frequently associated with marriage. If couple formation is considered, regardless of whether it occurs because of the decision to marry or the decision to share a household, then increases in non-marital cohabitation offset much of the decline in levels of marriage. Estimates of the proportion of successive birth cohorts from 1940-44 to 1960-64 who had married, had cohabited, or who had formed a union through either marriage or cohabitation by age 25 indicate that instead of a 21-point decline in proportions ever married by age 25 for females during the period, there would be only a 7-point decline if union formation was used as the measure.[42] Similarly, for males, instead of a 30-point decline in proportions ever married by age 25, there would be a 13-point decline.

In general cohabiting relationships are short-lived, either turning into marriages or dissolving after a relatively short period of time.[43] To the extent that such relationships are viewed as a convenient alternative to marriage because the individuals want a relationship but do not yet want children or a permanent commitment, then cohabitation is an "enabler," to use a term from the alcohol literature, of delayed marriage and helps to contribute to delayed childbearing. It allows individuals to defer decisions about marriage and childbearing, while still enjoying some of the benefits that marriage provides. Because such relationships are generally short-lived, individuals who cohabit may become more willing to also terminate marriages if they prove unsatisfactory. Researchers have found that persons who have cohabited prior to marriage are more likely to divorce than persons who have not done so.[44]

Divorce and Marital Disruption

Because marriage is being increasingly viewed as a way to personal fulfillment and divorce has become an acceptable way to end an unhappy marriage,[45] it is not surprising that rates of divorce rose dramatically during the 1960s and 1970s. They have since stabilized, but at very high levels (see Figure 1). It is estimated that two-thirds of all first marriages contracted nowadays will end in separation or divorce.[46]

About three out every four persons whose first marriages fail will eventually remarry.[47] Thus the high divorce rates do not mean that people are fleeing marriage entirely. On the other hand, remarriage rates have also been declining[48] in recent decades. There was a 40% decrease in remarriage rates among widowed women between 1965 and 1984 and a 33% decrease among divorced women during that same time period.[49]

Moreover, many remarriages will also end in divorce or separation. In fact, second

marriages have slightly higher disruption rates than first marriages.[50] However, once education and age at the first marriage are controlled for, the disruption rates for first and second marriages are about the same.[51]

About half (52%) of all divorces in 1987 involved couples with children under age 18.[52] Thus many remarriages include at least one partner with a child from a previous marriage. These changing patterns of divorce and remarriage have profoundly changed the family life of many children.[53] Many children nowadays have much more complicated family lives than earlier generations. They must learn to relate to step-parents, to step-siblings, and to step-relatives, in general. Furthermore, they may also experience the addition of half-siblings to their families -- children who share only one parent in common with them. Even children who do not live in step-families may have such relations through the remarriage of their absent parent. Moreover, when parents separate, children are often caught in the middle. It is often they who are shuttled between households in an effort to allow each parent time with their children. Thus many children give up, willingly or unwillingly, parts of their vacations or time at home to visit their absent parent -- if they are lucky enough to remain in contact with their absent parent.

Survey data indicate that Americans express considerable ambivalence towards divorce. On the one hand, people think divorce should be easily obtainable. On the other hand, they believe that divorce scars children. There is clearly a disparity between their attitudes and their behavior: they assert a belief in being married for life and yet divorce rates remain at high levels.[54]

Researchers have shown that the rising incidence of divorce is not a new phenomenon but rather a continuation of a pattern that dates back at least to the Civil War.[55] In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the pace of divorce accelerated sharply. Because the rising incidence of divorce is a long-standing trend, changes peculiar to recent decades such as changing sex role attitudes, the mass entry of women in the labor market, lower fertility, economic conditions, and changes in divorce laws cannot entirely explain the phenomenon.[56] Yet, they may help to explain why the divorce rates soared between 1967 and 1977. Samuel Preston and John McDonald found that the number of divorces that a marriage cohort experiences in any given year is highly responsive to period-specific conditions, such as economic conditions.[57] However, the experiences of individuals prior to marriage, particularly in the families they themselves grew up in, influence their responses to period pressures.[58] Their experiences growing up do appear to set the income and consumption standards to which they aspire when establishing their own families.

Fertility Patterns

Changes in patterns of marriage and divorce have had a large influence on the number and types of American households being established in the last 30 years, both family and non-family. Women's fertility behavior is another important factor in understanding the changing distribution of household types. By waiting longer to have children, a phenomenon referred to as

delayed childbearing, while also setting up their own households, young women of the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the increase in the proportion of non-family households and to the decrease in the proportion of family households. Similarly, a rapid rise in non-marital childbearing has greatly increased the proportion of single-parent families.

The current trend towards delayed childbearing is not a new phenomenon.[59] There have been broad swings in the fertility behavior of American women since the early part of this century, due in part to shifting economic conditions.[60] During the Depression, women delayed having children: levels of childlessness grew, and first birth rates at each age were low. With the improved economic climate following World War II, first birth rates at all ages increased, and levels of childlessness dropped to all time lows. First birth rates at all ages began to fall in the late 1950s from the high rates experienced during the baby boom years. Among women under age 25, first birth rates have continued to decline through 1988. However, since the early 1970s, first birth rates to women 25 and older have steadily increased,[61] prompting the coining of the term "delayed childbearing". As of 1988, first birth rates to women 25 and older are below, but are beginning to approach the high rates of the 1940s. In the 1940s, many women who had deferred childbearing during the Depression years began to have children.

Flunctuations in women's fertility can be vividly seen by looking at the proportion of women who have not borne children at ages 25-29 and 30-34 -- ages which are in the middle of what are usually considered the prime childbearing years of 15-44 (see Figure 2). The high rates of childlessness among today's young women -- rates that raise concern among many observers -- are in fact nearly identical to the rates of childlessness at the end of the Depression. In 1938, 43.1% of women age 25-29 and 28.3% of women age 30-34 were still childless; these rate compare with 43.0% and 25.7%, respectively, in 1988.[62] The nearly identical levels of childlessness at these ages, however, do not necessarily mean that the underlying causes for the high levels are the same.

What Frank Levy has referred to as "the quiet depression" of the 1973 to 1984 period, did not cause the same severe economic shock to society or to individuals as the Great Depression[63] and, therefore, probably did not elicit exactly the same fertility response from young women. Moreover, although economic conditions certainly influence marriage and fertility behavior[64], they are by no means the sole explanations for the patterns observed during the Depression, during the recovery following World War II, or in recent decades.[65]

As the economy dramatically improved following the Depression, young men and women responded to strong normative pressures to marry and to have children.[66] Such pressures have weakened considerably in recent decades.[67] Nowadays motherhood is more a matter of choice than of obligation.[68] In addition, attitudes towards sex roles have changed so that women have more freedom to pursue activites other than childbearing without incurring societal stricture.[69] Moreover, some observers argue that parenthood is less rewarding than in the past, as the intergenerational emphasis has shifted from what the child owes the parent to what the parent owes the child.[70] Most women, however, continue to want to have children, but by deferring

childbearing, they are running the risk of having fewer children than they would like or of remaining childless.

A more disturbing trend than delayed childbearing has been the sustained rise in childbearing outside of marriage. In 1940, less than 4 percent of births were to unmarried women. By 1987, nearly one-quarter of all births were to unmarried women. There is no sign that the proportions born out-of-wedlock will level off soon.

Most non-marital births are unplanned. The increase appears to be largely due to the extended period of time during which women remain unmarried and yet sexually active.[71] Thus, declining ages at sexual activity, increasing ages at marriage, and high levels of divorce and separation have all joined together to lengthen the period of time that women spend unmarried and thus exposed to the chance of a non-marital pregnancy.

There are two reasons why this trend is alarming. First, most of the children born to unmarried women grow up in poverty. Second, few of the fathers of these children remain involved in their lives. There is some evidence, however, that young unmarried black fathers may be more involved in their children's lives than previously thought.[72]

Female Labor Force Participation

An important feature of all of these trends is the increased labor force participation of women. Women have been entering the labor force throughout this century, including the 1950s (see Table 7a). In 1900, 20% of all working aged women were in the labor force. By 1950, the proportion had grown to 34%. In 1990, 57.2% of all females 16 years of age and older were in the labor force for at least part of the year.

Single women and divorced and separated women have always had higher labor force participation rates than married women. In 1990, 66.4% of the never married, 75.5% of the divorced, and 63.6% of separated women were in the labor force. Among women 25 to 44, the proportion of single, divorced, and separated women who are in the labor force has changed only slightly since 1950.[73]

What is remarkable about the last 30 years is the entry of married women with young children into the labor force. In the past, women used to work for a few years before they married and then they would withdraw from the labor force to raise their children, perhaps reentering once their children were older. In 1990, 59% of married women with a spouse present and with children under the age of 6 were either working or looking for work during at least some part of the year, up from 12% in 1950 and 19% in 1960 (see Figure 4). The increase has been steep, but very steady. Unlike with changes in the distribution of households, no one decade witnessed an usually large increase in the labor force participation of married women with children under 6.

These figures are constantly repeated in the media. It is important to remember, however, that not all married women with young children who are in the labor force are working full-time or all year round. In 1990, just over one-third of mothers whose youngest child was under three years of age were working full-time (see Table 7). Nearly half of mothers with a youngest child that young were not in the labor force at all. Still the increase is remarkable.

There are a variety of reasons why women have been increasing their labor force participation, particularly married women with children under 18. The most important factor has probably been the growth in women's wages, which has pulled women into the labor market -- especially more educated women who could command higher salaries.[74]

The entry of women into many professions that used to be almost entirely male, such as medicine and law, has received widespread attention. In 1950, only 6.5% of physicians and 4.1% of judges and lawyers were female. By 1989 the proportions were 18% and 22% respectively.[75] Although the proportion of women in these formerly male dominated occupations has increased, the proportion of working women who are in these professions is still quite small.[76] Therefore, increased opportunities to enter these fields only exerted a minor influence on women's entry into the labor market. A much more important factor has been the rapid expansion of service sector jobs, which have traditionally been held by women.[77] Traditionally female occupations such as clerical positions, sales, and elementary school teachers have absorbed the majority of women who have entered the labor force in recent decades.[78]

The sluggish economy after 1973 probably also had an influence on women's entry into the labor market. In many surveys women report working because of financial necessity.[79] Because men's wages grew more slowly than those of the previous generation,[80] family income did not increase as much as might be expected after 1970. A second earner has helped to maintain a more favorable growth in family income.[81]

As more and more women have entered the labor force and as their earnings abilities have increased, women have had less economic incentive to marry or to remain in marriages that are unsatisfactory.[82] On the other side of the coin, women whose marriages fail usually need to work in order to support themselves and their children, especially since only a minority of women receive child support payments from the outside father and among the women who do, the majority receive the payments irregularly.[83] Some analysts have also suggested that in this age of high marriage failure, it is safer for women to retain their earnings skills by remaining at least loosely attached to the labor force and also by keeping their fertility low so that in the event of a divorce they will not have as much difficulty supporting themselves and their children.[84] Norval Glenn has suggested that persons who marry with the idea that they will divorce if things do not work out may be less inclined to commit themselves or invest as fully in the marriage as they would otherwise.[85]

Consequences for Children

Children represent society's future. If we are to continue as a society we must reproduce ourselves and raise our children to be productive adults. One of the authors has written elsewhere a detailed review of recent trends in children's well-being,[86] so we will not dwell on that topic. Rather, in this section we describe how the fabric of children's lives has been altered by all the changes described above and by other changes in our society.

The most obvious change for children has been the dramatic increase in children who do not live with their fathers, either because their mothers never married or because of marital disruption. It is estimated that as many as 60 percent of children born in the mid-1980s will live in a single-parent family before reaching the end of their childhood.[87] Other researchers have shown that many children lose contact with their absent father. A study using the National Survey of Children found that 52 percent of adolescents living only with their mother had not seen their fathers at all in more than a year. Only 16 percent saw their fathers as often as once a week.[88] Even when the absent fathers maintain regular contact, truly cooperative parenting by divorced parents is rare. Much more common is "parallel parenting," with little coordination between the efforts of the two parents.[89] Moreover, a large proportion of absent fathers either do not provide any child support for their children or provide it only irregularly.[90] With the loss of one income and the receipt of little or no child support, many single-parent families slip into poverty and some, particularly black families, do not escape.[91]

Yet poverty is only one difficulty encountered by children in single-parent families. Data show that childhood emotional and behavioral problems are two to three times higher in single-parent and female-headed families than in mother-father families.[92] Grade repetition is also higher among children in these families, as is the likelihood of being suspended or expelled from school.[93]

There are other signs of stress in single-parent families. A lot of women with low educations who are single parents suffer from depression.[94] They tend to have poorer health behaviors including smoking.[95] Some evidence suggests that they may not be providing adequate stimulation for their children, which contributes to generally poorer school success among these children.[96]

Another dramatic change in children's lives has been the entry of mothers of young children into the labor force. To be sure, not all of these women work full-time or full-year. In 1987, only 23% of children under 6 living with their mothers had a mother who worked full-time, full-year, up from 9% in 1971 (see Table 8). Yet for many children, the increased labor force participation of mothers does mean that they spend a substantial amount of their days in the care of non-parents.

A study of married-couple families with children found that mothers in dual-earner families spent substantially less time with their children than mothers in single-earner families. Working mothers of preschoolers, for example, spent less than half as much time with their children compared with non-working mothers, who were able to spend approximately 525 minutes, or nearly 9 hours, in some contact with their children. In addition, working mothers of

older children spent about 2 hours less with their children than non-working mothers.[97] However, there was esentially no difference between dual-earner and single-earner families in the amount of time that fathers spent with their children, except that fathers of preschoolers in single-earner families spent more time eating meals with their children than fathers in dual-earner families.[98] Thus fathers in dual-earner families did not compensate for the parental time that was lost to children because of their mothers' working.

It would be a misinterpretation of these data, however, to say that working women are turning away from their children. Most of the differences in the time mothers spent with children were in activities where children are usually only peripherally involved, such as homemaking, visiting, and entertaining.[99]

The Black Experience

The experience of blacks is very different from that of whites.[100] This fact is illustrated by looking at family household arrangements. In 1988, married-couple families constituted a bare majority (51.3%) of all black family households, whereas among whites, married-couple families comprised 83.2% of all family households. Nearly 43% of black family households were headed by a female, compared to only 9% of white families. Such families, as noted earlier, are much more likely to live in poverty.[101]

The different family experiences of blacks and whites are even more starkly illustrated by looking at how black children are faring compared to white children. As of 1988, 61% of black children were not living with two parents, compared with 21% of white children. In addition, over 60% of all black children were born to unmarried mothers, compared with just over 15% of white children. And 44% of all black children were living in poverty compared with 15% of white children.

Several detailed studies of blacks in America[102] have recently offered various economic explanations -- ranging from the welfare system to the role of the employment and earnings of men, to the employment and earnings of women -- to account for the observed changes in family life. None of these explanations, however, have been very successful in accounting for the changes in either black or white families.[103] David Ellwood and Jonathan Crane believe that the observed changes are much more deep-seated and probably involve social, cultural, and legal factors as well as economic ones.[104]

Implications for Families

There is no doubt that American family life has undergone enormous changes in the last thirty years, changes which were especially pronounced during the 1960s and 1970s.[105] The demographic trends described earlier are clear. Not only are young men and women increasingly delaying marriage and childbearing, but divorce rates, after climbing dramatically, have stabilized at unprecedentedly high levels. More and more children are being born to unmarried mothers, and more and more children are living in single-parent families. Increasing

numbers of children (almost one in four) have little or no steady contact with their fathers. Moreover, the majority of women are now in the labor force, including many mothers with young children, which means that a substantial number of children spend large portions of their days in the care of someone other than a parent.

Perhaps as important as the demographic trends themselves have been the changes in values, attitudes, and norms of family life that have accompanied them. Here, too, the changes are clear. People have become more tolerant of a variety of forms of behavior.[106] Parenthood is now more of an option than an expectation or convention. Sex is no longer limited to marriage. Cohabitation among unmarried couples is increasingly acceptable. Non-marital childbearing no longer carries the stigma that it used to. Attitudes towards sex roles are much more egalitarian than in the past. Female employment after marriage and childbearing is no longer viewed negatively by the majority of the population. Divorce has become an acceptable way to end an unhappy marriage.[107] Marriage itself is being increasingly viewed as a way to personal fulfillment which, if it fails in this regard, can be terminated and fulfillment sought through other relationships.[108]

The general weakening of pressures to conform to prescribed behaviors and the shift towards greater tolerance for a variety of behaviors are not limited to the area of the family or sex roles but are also visible in the realms of religion, politics, and civil liberties.[109] In all of these areas, there is an increased emphasis on individual freedom and a decreased emphasis on obedience, loyalty, and conformity.[110] It is not clear to what extent these shifts in values and attitudes are the cause or the consequence of the demographic trends. In all likelihood they have influenced each other and both have been driven by larger forces as well.[111]

Taken together, these changes have generated sometimes heated debates about the future of the family. Many believe the family is in decline. When people refer to the family in this way, they usually mean the traditional nuclear family--defined as a man and a woman joined together for the duration of their lives in a monogamous, legal marriage for companionship, enjoyment, and sexual satisfaction, who maintain their own household, and whose most important function is the procreation and raising of children, with the husband as the breadwinner and the wife overseeing the household and the raising of children. The traditional nuclear family flowered in the United States during the 1950s and since that time has been fading. Its withering, some commentators believe, has been disastrous for America's children and for the nation's future.[112] They call for a renewed commitment on the federal government's part to support the traditional nuclear family, or, at the very least, to do it no more harm through misguided policies.[113]

Others note that the family has always been in decline, if by decline one means the loss of functions society once assigned to it, like the production of goods, the care of the elderly, and the education of the young.[114] They point out that the nuclear family, as it is nostalgically remembered, has only been with us a relatively short time, just over 100 years in Europe, perhaps longer in the United States.[115] Moreover, they note, the traditional nuclear family placed heavy demands on both men and women.[116] The husband not only had to be the breadwinner, but his success or failure reflected on his family. The woman was expected to provide a haven

from the demands of the world and, thereby, became increasingly isolated from the world. Moreover, she had to deny her own needs and interests as her responsibilities became narrowly focused on her family.

From this perspective, the family is not declining so much as it is being reshaped and transformed by new circumstances. It is we, as a society, who must in turn adapt to the realities of the new family in all its forms.[117] The proponents of this argument note that although the transformation has had negative consequences, particularly for children, there have been positive changes as well, particularly for women.[118] Whereas the traditional family lavishes attention on the child and has probably improved children's lives compared to what they were like in earlier centuries, this same type of family tends to isolate women and to demand that they be selfless creatures, ever responsive to the needs of others.[119] Recent changes have dramatically increased opportunities available to women, but have added other burdens as well.

Whether the family is disintegrating and being replaced by a postnuclear family system which places little importance on marriage and childbearing, as some argue,[120] or is being transformed, as others believe,[121] it is clear that the family is undergoing changes that are unlikely to be reversed in the near future.[122] Moreover, most family experts agree that as things now stand, we are failing a large segment of our children.

Underlying Forces

What are the larger forces that lie behind the changes listed above and lead to rising concern about the state of the family? One factor is the sustained growth in real income and wages that the U.S. has experienced during its history. This increased wealth has expanded the options individuals have for where they live, what they can buy, and even for their personal relationships.[123] Technological innovations, including better contraceptives which make possible sex without procreation, have been another factor.[124] Moreover, technological developments have provided us with even more choices for consumption and thus have altered the way we spend our time, as well as our money. Another factor may be the nature and organization of work under capitalist systems which encourages personal autonomy and freedom over allegiance to social groups and institutions.[125] Many observers suggest that a major force has been the rise of individualism, an increasing self-centeredness of individuals at the expense of the common good.[126] Individualism is an outlook on life that is so ingrained in us that it colors all of our decisions.[127]

Tocqueville was among the first to use the term individualism in writing his extraordinarily perceptive book, *Democracy in America*. He distinguished "egoism" from "individualism." According to him, "Egoism is the passionate and exaggerated love of self which leads a man to think of all things in terms of himself and to prefer himself to all."[128] Individualism, on the other hand, "is a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to look after

itself."[129] Tocqueville goes on to say, "Egoism sterilizes the seeds of every virtue; individualism at first only dams the spring of public virtues, but in the long run it attacks and destroys all the others too and finally merges in egoism."[130] Tocqueville believed that the tendency towards individualism grows as equality in a society grows, because it erodes the bonds between individuals and makes them believe that they are truly independent of their fellow citizens. In his words, "As social equality spreads there are more and more people who, though neither rich nor powerful enough to have much hold over others, have gained or kept enough wealth and enough understanding to look after their own needs. Such folk owe no man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody. They form the habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands."[131] What prevents this degeneration of individualism into egoism, he suggests, is the political system of the United States which gives "each part of the land its own political life so that there should be an infinite number of occasions for the citizens to act together and so that every day they should feel that they depended on one another."[132] It would seem in our day that that socio-political check is no longer working.

NOTES

1. *Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language*, Second Edition, unabridged, (Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1939).

2. U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Household and Family Characteristics: March 1988," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 437 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1989), pp. 129-130.

3. U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990* (110th edition) (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1990), Tables 2, 61.

4. Steven Ruggles, "The Demography of the Unrelated Individual: 1900-1950," *Demography*, 25 (4, 1988), pp. 521-536; Arland Thornton and Deborah Freedman, "The Changing American Family," *Population Bulletin*, 38 (4) (Washington, DC: The Population Reference Bureau), p. 29.

5. James A. Sweet and Larry L. Bumpass, *American Families and Households* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), p. 339.

6. Francis E. Kobrin, "The Fall in Household Size and the Rise of the Primary Individual in the United States," *Demography*, 13 (1, 1976), Table 1, p. 129.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

8. *Ibid.*, Table 1, p. 129.

9. Sweet and Bumpass, *Op. cit.*, p. 339.

10. Mellman & Lazarus, Inc., "MassMutual American Family Values Study: Results of Focus Group and Survey Research" (Washington, DC, undated).

11. Norval D. Glenn, "The Family Values of Americans," Paper prepared for the Wingspread Commission on the Family in America, Institute for American Values Working Paper No. WP7 (1991), pp. 17-18.

12. Irwin Garfinkel and Sara S. McLanahan, *Single Mothers and Their Children: A New American Dilemma* (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1986), p. 45.

13. Sar A. Levitan, Richard S. Belous, and Frank Galo, *What's Happening to the American Family? Tensions, Hopes, Realities* (Revised Edition)(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 5-6; James P. Smith, "Children Among the Poor," *Demography* (2, 1989), p. 243; Sheldon Danziger and Jonathan Stern, "The Causes and Consequences of Child Poverty in the United States," paper prepared for UNICEF, International Child Development Center (1990), p. 48.

14. Theoretically, the extent of immigration can also be a factor. For most of the period we are interested in, however, it has been relatively unimportant. For that reason, we will not discuss it. The Immigration Act of 1924 severely curtailed the amount of immigration into this country and, thus, after that time immigration played only a minor role in our country's growth. With the relaxation of immigration laws during the 1980s, immigration is once again becoming a more important factor in our country's growth, particularly for certain states, including California and New York (Barbara Vobejda, "U. S. Growth in the 1980s Fueled by Immigrants," *The Washington Post*, Monday, December 31, 1990).

15. The baby boom is usually defined as the cohort of individuals born between 1947 and 1964.

16. Leon Bouvier, "America's Baby Boom Generation: The Fateful Bulge," *Population Bulletin*, 35 (1), (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 1980), pp. 16-17.

17. James A. Sweet, "Components of Change in the Number of Households, 1970-1980," *Demography*, 21 (1984), p. 137.

18. Lawrence L. Santi, "The Demographic Context of Recent Change in the Structure of American Households," *Demography*, 25 (4, 1988), p. 516; Sweet, 1984, *Op. cit.*, p. 137.

19. Sweet, 1984, *Op. cit.*, p. 138.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-140.

21. Santi, *Op. cit.*, p. 516.

22. Sweet, *Op. cit.*, Table 8, p. 138.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 139; National Center for Health Statistics, L. Fingerhut, "Changes in Mortality Among the Elderly, United States, 1940-78," supplement to 1980 *Vital and Health Statistics*, Series 3, No. 22a, DHHS Pub. No. (PHS) 84-1406a, (Public Health Service, Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, April 1984), p. 10.

24. Sweet, 1984, *Op. cit.*, p. 135.

25. U. S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, *U.S. Children and Their Families: Current Conditions and Recent Trends*, Third Edition, prepared by Child Trends, Inc. (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 109.

26. National Center for Health Statistics, 1984, *Op. cit.*, Table 1, p. 8; Beth Soldo and Emily M. Agree, "America's Elderly," *Population Bulletin*, 43 (3) (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, 1988), p. 17.

27. Soldo and Agree, 1988, *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

28. Frank Levy, *Dollars and Dreams: The Changing American Income Distribution* (NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1987), pp. 60-61.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

31. U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Population Profile of the United States, 1989," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 159 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, April 1989).

32. Lawrence L. Santi, "Household Headships Among Unmarried Persons in the United States, 1970-1985," *Demography*, 27 (2, 1990), p. 230.

33. Sweet, 1984, *Op. cit.*, Table 7, p. 138.

34. Median age at marriage is a measure based on marriages contracted in a given year. It is calculated by forming a frequency distribution of the ages of all the men (or all the women) who first married in a particular year. The age at which half the men (or women) who married in that year have married and half have not is the median age at first marriage. Thus, it is not reflective of the experience of a birth cohort of individuals and it does not take into account individuals who have not yet married. Moreover, the most important aspect of the measure is the pace (or ages) at which the first half of the marriage cohort marries. For example, if 100 women married in year *x* and half did so at age 18 and the other half did so at age 30, the median age at marriage in year *x* would be 18. Measuring the spread of the ages at which men and women wed is, therefore, also important. Arlene Saluter of the Census Bureau has shown that the ages at which women marry have become much less concentrated since 1970, reflecting a weakening in the imperative to marry (U. S. Bureau of the Census, Arlene F. Saluter, "Singleness in America," in "Studies in Marriage and the Family," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 162 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, June 1989).

35. Sandra L. Hofferth, Joan R. Kahn, and Wendy Baldwin, "Premarital Sexual Activity Among U.S. Teenage Women Over the Past Three Decades," *Family Planning Perspectives*, 19 (1987), p. 14.

36. Arlene F. Saluter, "Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1990," U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 450 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, May 1991), Table 0, p. 15.

37. These figures are only approximate. The estimates are obtained by counting households with two unmarried adults (defined as persons 18 years of age or older) of the opposite sex sharing living quarters. Children under 15 may or may not be present. Cohabiting couples living with other adults are missed, as are cohabiting couples with at least one partner under 18, and some employee-employer households or owner-tenant households are inadvertently included in the

estimates (U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1991, *Op. cit.*, p. 14).

38. Saluter, 1991, *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

39. *Ibid.*, Table 8, p. 73.

40. Larry L. Bumpass and James A. Sweet, "National Estimates of Cohabitation," *Demography* 26 (4, 1989), pp. 615-625.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*

43. Arland Thornton, "Cohabitation and Marriage in the 1980s," *Demography* 25 (4, 1988), pp. 497-508.

44. Bumpass and Sweet, 1989, *Op. cit.*, p. 615.

45. Thornton, 1988, *Op. cit.*; Glenn, 1991, *Op. cit.*

46. Teresa Castro Martin and Larry L. Bumpass, "Recent Trends in Marital Disruption," *Demography*, 26 (1, 1989), pp. 37-51.

47. Larry L. Bumpass, James A. Sweet, and Teresa Castro Martin, "Changing Patterns of Remarriage," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 52 (3, 1990), pp. 747-756.

48. *Ibid.*

49. *Ibid.*

50. National Center for Health Statistics, 1990, *Op. cit.*

51. Martin and Bumpass, 1989, *Op. cit.*

52. National Center for Health Statistics, 1990, *Op. cit.*

53. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Christine Winquist Nord, James L. Peterson, and Nicholas Zill, "The Life Course of Children of Divorce: Marital Disruption and Parental Contact," *American Sociological Review*, 48 (October 1983); Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. and Christine Winquist Nord, "Parenting Apart: Patterns of Childrearing After Marital Disruption," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 74 (4, November 1985), pp. 893-904.

54. Thornton, 1989, *Op. cit.*; Glenn, 1991, *Op. cit.*

55. Samuel H. Preston and John McDonald, "The Incidence of Divorce Within Cohorts of

American Marriages Contracted Since the Civil War," *Demography*, 16 (1979), pp. 1-25.

56. Martin and Bumpass, 1989, *Op. cit.*

57. Preston and McDonald, 1979, *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

58. *Ibid.*

59. Wendy H. Baldwin and Christine Winquist Nord, "Delayed Childbearing in the U.S.: Facts and Figures," *Population Bulletin*, 39 (4, 1984) (Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau).

60. Ronald R. Rindfuss, S. Philip Morgan, and Gray Swicegood, *First Births in America: Changes in the Timing of Parenthood* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988).

61. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

62. Robert L. Heuser, *Fertility Tables for Birth Cohorts by Color* (Washington, DC: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1976); National Center for Health Statistics, 1990, *Op. cit.*

63. Levy, 1987, *Op. cit.*, pp. 62, 209.

64. Samuel H. Preston, "Demographic Change in the United States, 1970-2050," paper prepared for Conference on Demography and Retirement: The 21st Century, sponsored by the Pension Research Council, University of Pennsylvania, May 9-10, 1991, p. 28; Samuel H. Preston, "Changing Values and Falling Birth Rates" *Population and Development Review* Supplement to Volume 12 (1986), p. 177; Rindfuss, Morgan, and Swicegood, *Op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

65. Preston, 1991, *Op. cit.*, p. 28-29; Preston, 1986, *Op. cit.*, p. 177; Norman B. Ryder, "What Is Going to Happen to American Fertility?" *Population and Development Review*, 16 (3, September 1990), p. 447.

66. Ryder, 1990, *Op. cit.*, p. 447.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 447.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 447.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 447.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 448.

71. Larry L. Bumpass, "What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic and Institutional Change," *Demography*, 27 (4, 1990), pp. 483-498.

72. Frank L. Mott, "When Is a Father Really Gone? Paternal-Child Contact in Father Absent

Homes," *Demography*, 27 (4, 1990), pp. 499-517.

73. Victor R. Fuchs, *How We Live* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983) p. 128.

74. Preston, 1991, *Op. cit.*, p. 25; Fuchs, 1983, *Op. cit.*, pp. 131-133.

75. U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Perspectives in Working Women: A Databook," *Bulletin*, 2080 (Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, October 1980), Table 11, p. 10; U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings*, 37 (1, January 1990), Table 22, p. 183.

76. Levy, 1987, *Op. cit.*, p. 143.

77. Fuchs, 1983, *Op. cit.*, pp. 127-133.

78. Levy, 1987, *Op. cit.*, pp. 143, 148.

79. Fuchs, 1983, *Op. cit.*, p. 130.

80. Levy, 1987, *Op. cit.*, pp. 125-126.

81. Suzanne M. Bianchi and Daphne Spain, *American Women in Transition* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986), p. 168.

82. Levy, 1987, *Op. cit.*

83. James L. Peterson and Christine Winquist Nord, "The Regular Receipt of Child Support: A Multistep Process," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 52 (2, May 1990), p. 542.

84. Fuchs, 1983, *Op. cit.*, p. 133.

85. Norval D. Glenn, "The Family Values of Americans," paper prepared for the Commission on Families in America, Institute for American Values Working Paper No. WP7, 1991, p. 13.

86. Nicholas Zill and Carolyn C. Rogers, "Recent Trends in the Well-Being of Children in Stepfamilies," in Andrew J. Cherlin, ed., *The Changing American Family and Public Policy* (Washington DC: The Urban Institute Press, 1988).

87. Norton and Glick, "One Parent Families: A Social and Economic Profile," *Family Relations*, 35 (1, 1986), p. 16.

88. Furstenberg, Nord, Peterson, and Zill, *Op. cit.*, 1983.

89. Furstenberg and Nord, *Op. cit.*, 1985.

90. James L. Peterson and Christine Winquist Nord, "The Regular Receipt of Child Support: A Multistep Process," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 52 (2, 1990), pp. 539-551.

91. Sheldon Danziger and Jonathan Stern, "The Causes and Consequences of Child Poverty in the United States," prepared for UNICEF, International Child Development Center, Project on Child Poverty and Deprivation in Industrialized Countries (1990).

92. Nicholas Zill and Charlotte Schoenborn, "Developmental, Learning, and Emotional Problems: Health of Our Nation's Children, United States, 1988," *Advance Data* (190, 1990), p. 8.

93. Sara McLanahan, "The Consequences of Single Parenthood for Subsequent Generations," *Focus*, 2 (3, 1988), pp. 16-21; R. F. Emery, "Marriage, divorce and children's adjustment," *Developmental Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry*, Vol. 14 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988).

94. Nicholas Zill, Kristin A. Moore, Christine Winquist Nord, and Thomas Stief, *Welfare Mothers as Potential Employees: A Statistical Profile Based on National Survey Data*, Report of Child Trends, Inc. (Washington, DC: Child Trends, February 25, 1991), pp. 30-31; Gregory Weeks, C. Viktor Gecas, Russell M. Lidman, Monica Seff, Ernst W. Stromsdorer, and John Tarnai, *Washington State's Family Income Study: Results from the First Year*, Report of the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (1990), Chapter 5, p. 5.

95. Zill *et al.*, *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 28; Nicholas Zill, Kristen A. Moore, Ellen Wolpow Smith, Thomas Stief, and Mary Jo Coiro, *The Life Circumstances and Development of Children in Welfare Families: A Profile Based on National Survey Data*, Report of Child Trends, Inc. (Washington, DC: Child Trends, Inc., October 29, 1991), pp. 25, 26.

96. Sara McLanahan, "Family Structure and the Reproduction of Poverty," *American Journal of Sociology*, 90 (1985), pp. 873-901; Zill *et al.*, ("Welfare Mothers ...," February 25, 1991), *Op. cit.*, pp. 19-24.

97. Steven L. Nock and Paul William Kingston, "Time with Children: The Impact of Couples' Work-Time Commitments," *Social Forces* 67 (1, 1988), pp. 67-68.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

99. *Op. cit.*, p. 71.

100. Reynolds Farley, "After the Starting Line: Blacks and Women in an Uphill Race," *Demography*, 25 (4, 1988), pp. 477-495; Reynolds Farley and Walter R. Allen, *The Color Line and the Quality of Life in America* (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1987); Stanley Lieberson, *A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants Since 1880* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980).

101. Garfinkel and McLanahan, 1986, *Op. cit.*

102. Farley and Allen, *Op. cit.*, 1987; David T. Ellwood and Jonathan Crane, "Family Change Among Black Americans: What Do We Know?" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 4 (4, 1990), pp. 65-84; National Black Child Development Institute, 1990; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1989.

103. Ellwood and Crane, 1990, *Op. cit.*

104. *Ibid.*

105. Samuel H. Preston, "The Vanishing American Family: A Demographer's Perspective," *Penn Arts & Sciences* (Spring, 1990), pp. 8-10.

106. Thornton, 1989, *Op. cit.*

107. Thornton, 1989, *Op. cit.*; Glenn, forthcoming, *Op. cit.*

108. Glenn, forthcoming, *Op. cit.*; David Popenoe, *Disturbing the Nest: Family Change and Decline in Modern Societies* (NY: Aldine de Gryter, 1988); Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, *Habits of the Heart* (NY: Harper & Row, 1985); Carl N. Degler, *At Odds: Women and Family in America from the Revolution to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (NY: Basic Books, 1975).

109. Thornton, 1989, *Op. cit.*; Duane F. Alwin, "From Obedience to Autonomy: Changes in Traits Desired in Children, 1924-1978," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 52 (1, 1988), pp. 33-52; John Mueller, "Trends in Political Tolerance," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 52 (1, 1988), pp. 1-25; Norval D. Glenn, "Social Trends in the United States: Evidence from Sample Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 51 (Supplement, 1987), pp. 5109-5126.

110. Thornton, 1989, *Op. cit.*; Glenn, 1987, *Op. cit.*; Alwin, 1988, *Op. cit.*

111. Bumpass, 1990, *Op. cit.*, pp. 483-498.

112. Working Group on the Family, *The Family: Preserving America's Future*, report prepared for President Reagan (November 1986).

113. *Ibid.*

114. Preston, 1990, *Op. cit.*; Popenoe, 1988, *Op. cit.*

115. Edward Shorter, 1975, *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

116. John Demos, *Past, Present, and Personal: The Family and the Life Course in American History* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 33.

117. Sanford Dornbusch, Comments in response to an article by David Popenoe entitled "The Family Transformed," *Family Affairs*, 2 (2-3, 1989)(Institute for American Values), p. 3.

118. Preston, 1990, *Op. cit.*; Popenoe, 1988, *Op. cit.*; Dornbusch, 1989, *Op. cit.*

119. Shorter, 1975, *Op. cit.*, Chapter 5.

120. Popenoe, 1988, *Op. cit.*

121. Dornbusch, 1989, *Op. cit.*; Shorter, 1975, *Op. cit.*

122. Bumpass, 1990, *Op. cit.*

123. Preston, 1990, *Op. cit.*

124. Preston, 1990, *Op. cit.*; Popenoe, 1988, *Op. cit.*

125. Margaret Mooney Marini, "The Rise of Individualism in Advanced Industrial Societies" (unpublished manuscript, 1990); Larry Bumpass, 1990, *Op. cit.*

126. Bumpass, 1990, *Op. cit.*; Marini, 1990, *Op. cit.*; Bellah *et al.*, 1985, *Op. cit.*; Glenn, 1987, *Op. cit.*; Preston, 1984, *Op. cit.*

127. Bellah *et al.*, 1985, *Op. cit.*

128. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J.P. Mayer (NY: Anchor Books, 1969).

129. *Ibid*, p. 506.

130. *Ibid*, p. 507.

131. *Ibid*, p. 508.

132. *Ibid*, p. 511.